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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

THE LEGAL TENDER CASES-A DRAMA OF AMERICAN LEGAL AND FINANCIAL HISTORY.
THE facts giving rise to the Legal Tender Cases 1 lead back
to one of the darkest periods of the Civil War, from the
standpoint of the North, and to a type of problem which is now
absent from the national life.
On February 25, 1862, the date of the passage of the first
Legal Tender Act, 2 the financial situation of the government
was desperate. Armies were in the field, and the duration of the
war and the extent of its expense had already greatly exceeded
the estimates made at the beginning of the conflict. The· Treasury was empty, and the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P.
Chase of Ohio, was confronted with the necessity of raising
funds without delay by the use of some new expedient. Commencing about two months earlier, 3 the banks throughout the
country and the government had been compelled to suspend
specie payments; that is,- they could no longer pay in gold those
demanding such payments in exchange for government bills 4 or
state bank bills which had ·been in general circulation as money.
The suspension of specie payments was a very serious matter. The position of both the gov~rnment and the banks in
dealing with the public was seriously impaired. Public confidence in the government was lessened, and strength was lent to
that section of public opinion which already felt that it was
not going to be worth "the cost o£ the .struggle to conquer the
South.
1
Legal Tender Case (Juillard v. Green,man), 110 U. S. 421 (1884); Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis), 79 U. S. 457 (1871);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1870).
• Act Feb. 25, 1862, c. 33, 12 Stat. 345.
• The exact date was December 30, 1861. DswtY, FINANCIAL HisTORY oJ!
THS UNitt!> STATSs (lOth ed. 1924) 281.
4
The government had therefore issued demand notes under the Act Dec.
17, 1860, c. 1, 12 Stat. 121, of which $33,460,000 were then in circulation.
Dswsv, op. cit. supra note 3, at 281.
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In addition to this, the government was unable to secure further funds from the banks on its demand notes, or in exchange
for -bonds even at an interest rate of 7.3 per cent. , The immediate needs of the war were so great, the government being
$60,000,000 i~ arrears on the one item of the meagre pay of
the soldiers and sailors, 5 and the expenses of the government
being $2,000,000 per day, 6 that there was no time left to conduct a general campaign to sell •bonds to the public. Taxation
was too slow a process to afford any relief. Taxes should have
been levied on an extensive scale earlier in the struggle, but no
one had realized what was ahead.
There were only two ways to secure at once the necessary
funds. One was to issue bonds. and sell them upon the market
for whatever they would bring, and the other was to print more
paper money and use it to pay the government's bills. If .bonds
were issued they could only be sold at ruinous discounts, and
such a display of weakness on the part of the government would
tend to further impair the confidence of the people, without
which a successful prosecution of. the war seemed impossible.
This, and the rapid increase in the public debt through bonds,
would cause many others to feel that the conflict should be
abandoned. Opinion was sharply divided, •both among public· men and in financial circles, ·but it was decided that bonds
should not ·be issued. As soon as paper money was turned to,
the question arose as to whether it should be made legal tender
for private purposes, that is, as to whether creditors should be
compelled by law to accept the new paper at its face value in
the payment of private obligations.
From the adoption of the Constitution to the recent suspension of specie payments, it had always been possible to exchange
government bills upon demand for gold. It was foreseen 7 that·
any extensive issuance •by the government of paper money not
redeemable in gold would result in a rapid depreciation of its
value. This would be reflected in an increasing premium upon
• 4 RHODES, HISTORY OJ! TH~ UNittn STATES (1906) 242.
• 3 ibid. 562.
T D~WSY, op. cit. s11pra note 3, at 287.
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gold. The suspension of specie payments had already caused
gold to be worth upon the market stightly more than its nominal
equivalent in paper money. 8
Paper money had not before been made legal tender in payment of private obligations. If this status were to be given the
paper now to be issued, the effect upon the relations of private
parties throughout the country ·was easy to foresee. Debts which
had been contracted upon the pre-existing gold basis would now
be paid with depreciated paper money. In all future dealings
the nature of the legal tender could ·be taken into consideration,
and prices fixed accordingly, but as to debts already contracted
the effect would ·be inescapable. A depreciation of ten per cent.
in the value of the legal tender would mean a transfer of ten
per cent. of all the debts in the -country from creditors to debtors.
The government as the largest debtor in the country would be
the -chief beneficiary of the process. Proponents and adversaries
of the legal tender feature agreed that this would ·be a most unfortunate and unjust result.
However, against all objections of every kind stood the absolute necessity that the government have money at once to use
fcir all purposes of the war. It was felt necessary to make the
new money legal tender in payment of preexisting debts so that
those receiving it from the government could discharge their obligations with it. Many of the soldiers' families had .been compelled to contract debts because of the delay in paying the soldiers, and they needed money with which those obligations could
be satisfied. Also, i£ creditors of the government were to be paid
in money which they could not use in discharge of their own
obligations they would ·be seriously discriminated against. It
was true that without making the new money legal tender these
results could be avoided if the government would give all per·sons with whom it dealt an additional amount, but the necessity
of maintaining public confidence made this impossible.
The advocates of the legal tender feature were also influenced
by ideas of national sovereignty. Banks were attacked, and it
was argued that the government should make itself independent
• DEWEY,

op. ·cit. supra note 3, at 293.
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of hanks and Wall Street hy making its paper legal tender for
all purposes. 9
Secreta_ry Chase held hack from the drastic step of issuing
such legal tender, 10 and worked out a plan with representatives
of ·leading banks whereby it could be avoided. After the banking representatives had returned to their various cities, however,
one wired back that his principals would not agree to the plan,
and rather than inflict a hardship upon those hanks which would
cooperate with the government it was abandoned. 11 Secretary
Chase, in reply to a direct request from the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives, finally stated that
in his opinion legal tender notes had become necessary, and thereafter he energetically urged their issuance. Both public men
and financiers were unable to agree whether the government
could successfully pass through the emergency without legal
tender notes, 12 lbut after the most careful consideration 13 the
decision was made in favor of issuance, and on February 25,
1862, the Act was .passed, providing for such notes in the amount
of $150,000,000. A ·leading historian has termed this Act "one
of the landmarks in the history of American finance." 14
Once the course had been embarked upon, there was no turning ·back. Large additional issues of legal tender notes were
necessary in 1862 and 1863.15 The greatest total amount outstanding at any time was $433,160,569, in 1865.16
• D:ewsY, ~- cit. supra note 3, at 285.
"' HART, Lm oF SAr.MoN PoRTI.AND CHASE (1899) 247, 249.
n 3 RHODES, ~- cit. supra note 5, at 563.
12
The following authorities approve the issuan.ce of the legal tender notes:
BOGART, EcoNOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1913) 386; CAsE.
CoNSTITUTIONAl. HISTORY oF THE UNITED STATES (1904) 247; SPAUI.DING,
HISTORY OF THE LEGAr. TEND:ER P APE& MoNEY IssuED DuRING THE GREAT
ReB:er.uoN (1869) 210. The following disapprove: HART, op. cit. s11pra note
10, at 411; McCur.r.ocH, MEN AND MEAsUR:Es OF HAI.F A CENTURY (1888)
175. Baron von Hock, the Austrian financier, in "Die Finanzen und die
Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten" (Stuttgart, 1867), said that the
issue of paper mon.ey is conceded to be jutifiable when a state is involved in
a struggle for its own existence, after all resources of taxation and credit
have been exhausted, although it is the most expensive and detrimental of
all mearts of raising reven.ue. See 3 RHon:Es, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 471.
12
CAsE, op. cit. s11pra note 12, at 245.
11
DEWEY, op. cit. s11pra note 3, at 284.
15
4 RHODES, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 237; SPAUI.DING, op. cit. s11pra note
12, at 154, 187; DEWEY, op. cit. s11Pra note 3, at 288.
11
SEN. REP. No. 275, 42d Cong. 3d Sess., Ser. No. 1548, at 1; SHERMAN,

136

VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

As expected, the legal tender notes depreciated in value as
compared with gold. The maximum depreciation was on July
11, 186-t-, when one dollar in gold was worth $2.850 in legal
tender.H On July 1, 1865, at the close of active hostilities, a
dollar in gold was worth $1.41, 18 and on February 7, 1870, the
date of the first legal tender decision, $1.21.1 9 For a time the
notes were somewhat supported by an option to convert into
government bonds, the principal and interest of which were payable only in gold specie, -but this was terminated in 1863.20 In
order that depreciation of the notes might not lessen the revenue
from the duty on imports, the notes were never made receivable
for customs dues, and this increased the depreciation. 21
It is now known that during any extensive war, inflation·must
follow the rapid expansion of. the amount of available credit
through government war loans. At that time, however, the quantity theory of money-that the value of the currency in ·terms of
commodities depends upon the extent of the supply of all forms
of money and credit-had not been developed. Consequently
those who had opposed the issuance of the legal tenders attributed
to them all th~ effects of the war-time inflation, although they
were really only a contributing factor.
The effect of the inflation from all causes was to produce great
distress and hardship among certain classes of creditors, particularly widows and others dependant upon small fixed incomes.
A historian says that "the government not only cheated its own
creditors but enabled every debtor in the land to do lik~wise." 22
There was a reduction of one-fifth to one-sixth in the real inStLlttTED SPttCH:ES AND RtPORTS ON FINANC!; AND TAXATION FROM 1859 TO
1873 (1879) 381; DtwtY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 332. 4 RHoDtS, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 428, gives the figure as $432,687,966.
This was in addition to fractional currency and interest-bearing notes running for a brief period, both of which were also endowed with the legal tender quality, but neither of which were important in their effect. Dtw:EY, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 288, 310.
17
PoMtROY, LIFt oF STEPH:EN ]. FitLD (1881) 66; DtwSY, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 293; SPAULDING, op. cit. supra note 12, at 199.
10
SPAULDING, op. cit. supra n.ote 12, at 212.
,. HART, op. cit. supra note 10, at 397; 6 RHoDts, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 265.
"" Dt\V:EY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 290.
21
DtwtY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 287.
"' 6 RHoots, op. cit. supra note 5, at 264.
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comes of wage earners, because of the slowness of adjustment
of wages to the new currency level. 23 On the other hand, active business men were correspondingly benefited. Many were
enabled easily to pay off their debts, and thus felt encouraged to initiate new enterprises. 24 In addition to those who were
actually amassing fortunes, others who were slow to realize that
the value of a dollar had decreased felt that they were getting
rich, and both classes were spurred on to greater activity. 25 Of
course all metals 26 had disappeared from circulation at the first
threat of inflation of the currency, before the actual issuance of
the first legal tender notes. Due to the dearth of coins, for a
time "shinplasters," i. e., bills less than a dollar, issued by private concerns, and stamps, were used for change, with resulting
inconvenience. 27 Picture the citizen paying a bus driver his fare
in stamps on a rainy, windy morning, or going shopping with
a roll of. three cent stamps, which was the denomination most
commonly used. This was later remedied by the issuance of
fractional bills ·by the government.
In the end the cost of the war was greatly increased by the
use of the legal tenders. Dewey in his financial history says: 28

"* ·* * The total effect of paper issues in increasing the
cost of the war has been estimated at between $528,000,000
and $600,000,000; even this large amount is small when
compared with the burdens which inflated prices placed upon
the people in the ordinary relations of trade and industry."
The fluctuating premium on gold caused a gold exchange to be
opened in New York City. The usual exchange phenomena of
speculation followed. 29
Coincidentally with the inflation there occurred, in the fall of
1862, a marked revival of business. From then until the end
.. Mrrcm;z.L,
"' POMEROY,

A HISTORY oF 'l'H£ GR:e:eNBACKs (1903) 351, 395, 398.
op. cit. supra note 17, at 66; 5 RHOD:€5, op. cit. supra note 5,

at 202.

op. cit. supra note 12, at 210.
"" Nearly all the American coinage had been gold, although silver had appeared in circulation as minor coin and in insignifican.t amounts in the form
of dollars. D:ew:EY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 211, 403.
"' 5 RHOD:€5, op. cit. supra note 5, at 191.
"" D:EWF:Y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 293.
20
D:EW:EY, op. cit. snpra note 3, at 295-7.
z SPAULDING,
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of tlie war the Xorth was economically prosperous, without further occasion for alam1 in regard to the financial condition of
the gO\·ernment. The advocates of the issuance of the legal
tender notes now overestimated their · importance, 30 and attributed all the new prosperity to the use of. the legal tender
device. 31
\Vith this background the stage was set for a very important
decision by the United States Supreme Court in regard to the
constitutionality of the legal tender provisions of the various
acts, the decision being rendered February 7, 1870. By the
time the question reached the Supreme Court in shape for decision, Salmon P. Chase, who as Secretary of the Treasury had
reluctantly and apparently against his own ·better judgment secured the passage of the Legal Tender Ads, had become Chief
Justice. It was perhaps an unparalleled situation in American
jurisprudence, at least in connection with a matter of such universal importance, for a judicial officer to ·be charged with the
responsibility of passing upon the validity of his own acts as
an executive officer.
As gold was still at a premium of twenty-one cents when the
decision was rendered, a very important practical question was
involved. The distress occasioned by the passage of the original Legal Tender Act was now long past, and largely forgotten, and if the legal tender provision was now to be held invalid another great upsetting of the relations of debtors and
creditors would occur. This time the change would be in favor
of. creditors at the expense of debtors, but the ones benefited
now would rarely be those who suffered, when the original Act
was passed. All the other effects necessarily attendant upon
any sudden change in the standard of value would again follow. This time wage earners and those having fixed incomes
would benefit.
The constitutional question was a very nice one. On the one
hand, it was argued that the power given Congress in regard to
the monetary system is "To coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin," 32' and that the term "coin" ap•• 5 Raonts, op. cit. s11pra note 5, at 200.
31
Hepburn v. Griswold, s11pra note 1, at 633.
33
U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 8.
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plies only to metals. On the other hand, it was contended that
the Constitution gives Congress power to "borrow Money on
the credit of the United States" 33 and to regulate commerce,
and that the power to issue legal tenders is necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the enumerated powers. Fundamentally the contest represented a clashing of the Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian theories in regard to the national government..
Never before the Civil \V ar had there been a suggestion by
any responsible -official of the Federal Government that there was
any power to make anything other than gold and silver a legal
tender in payment -of private obligations. 34 Webster in a speech
in the Senate had expressed a belief that no such power existed. 35
On the other hand, the question was not foreclosed by the language of the' Constitution, and those who favored the legal tenders claimed that the Union ~ould not have been preserved without
their issuance. Making this assumption, they then contended that
it was unthinkable that the Constitution prohibited the exercise
of any power necessary t-o the preservation of the government.
The situati-on when the case was abqut to be decided has been described as follows :36

"* * *

The probable action of the Court had been the subject of long and excited debate in the ~ommunity. On the
one side, were the National and State banks, the mortgagees and creditors who demanded payment in gold; lined
up with these interests were those men who, on principle,
denied the right -of the Federal Government to make paper
currency legal tender, and opposed legalized cheating through
the enforced payments of debts in depreciated ~urrency.
On the other side; were the railroads, the municipal corporations, the mortgagors of land and other debtors who
now sought to pay, with a depreciated legal tender currency, debts contraded on a gold basis bef-ore the war; and
with these interests, there were associated all those men
who felt strongly that the Government ought not to be deprived -of a power which they considered so necessary to
its existence in time of war. * * *"

.. Ibid.
"' HART, op. cit. supra note 10, at 408.
.. Quoted in dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field, Legal Tender Cases
(Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis), supra note 1, at 659.
.. 3 WARREN, Tu:e SuPR:eM:e CouRT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1922) 221.
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The cases were argued and reargued by numerous and distinguished counsel. lt is probable that never in the history of
the Court has any question been more thoroughly considered
before decision. 37
.:\t first sight it would seem that the public would expect the
Court to lean toward upholding what the Chief Justice had
done as Secre.tary of the Treasury, but other decisions touching fringes of the problem showed a leaning on the part of the
Court against the legal tenders, 38 ·and the rumor spread that
such would be the decision. 39 In this instance the veil has been
withdrawn from the proceedings of. the Justices in conference, 40
and it has been di~closed that when the case was taken up, on November 27, 1869, it was found, after a conference of several
hours, in which all members of the Court participated, that the
eight judges then on the Court were evenly divided. 41 They
. thereupon proceeded to the consideration of other cases, and in
the c<>urse of the discussion of another case during the same
conference Mr. Justice Robert C. Grier, then seventy-five years
of age and unable to walk alone, made a statement inconsistent
with his previous vote in fav<>r of the constitutionality of the
legal tender provision. This led to further discussion of the
question with him, and, after being reminded ·by another member of the Court of what he had agreed to in a private conversation, he changed his vote, and joined those who were against
constitutionality. The Court then stood five t~ thre~ against
constitutionality. Within a week all the other members of the
Court united in advising Mr. Justice Grier that it was their
"' Dissenting opinions in Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and Parker v.
Davis), supra note 1, at 603, 634.
"" DEWEY, op. cit. sttPra note 3, at 362.
"" ScHUCKERS, LIFE AND PuBLIC SERVICES oF SALMON PoRTLAND CHASE
(1874) 265.
•• The disclosure was made in a paper prepared by Mr. Justice Miller and
signed by the other members of the later majority at the time of. the second
legal ten.der decision. The statem~nt was prepared in reply to one by Chief
Justice Chase, which he had placed upon the files of the Court. When Chase
learned that a reply would be made he withdrew his statement. Consequently,
that of the majority was not filed. It was published in BRADLEY, MISCELLANEous WRITINGS (1902) 71-4, and in (1902) 5 LAw NoTEs 229.
n BRADLEY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 54, 71, 73; PoMEROY, op. cit. supra
not~ 17, at 75; 6 RHoDES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 262.
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opinion that his physical condition was such that he ought to
resign. He submitted his resignation, to take effect February
1, 1870, and retired from the Court on that date, dying the
following September 26th.
It was <:ontemplated that the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold,
the legal tender case, would be handed down January 31st, in
which event Grier would have participated in it. It was, however, postponed one week, at the request of the minority, in order
to enable dissenting opinions to be prepared, and <:onsequently
was not rendered until February 7, 1870, six days after Grier's
resignation had taken effect. Thus the decision was technically
participated in only by seven Justices, divided four against three,
in a Court legally composed of nine.
As the <:onstitutional question was a novel one neither side
was able to make a convincing argument based upon precedents,
and neither was able to make a clear showing upon the words of
the Constitution. Chief Justice Chase, for the majority, emphasized the fact that the Federal Government was one of limited
powers, while Mr. Justice Miller, for the minority, stressed the
absolute necessity for the existence of the legal tender power,
stating that without its exerdse the government would have
perished, "and, with it, the Constitution which we are now called
upon to construe with such nice and critical a<:curacy." 42
Dramatic events followed fast upon announcement of the decision. An act had been passed on April 10, 1869,43 increasing
the membership of the Court from eight to nine, to take effect
the first Monday in December, 1869, and on February 7, 1870,
the day the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold was announced,
President Grant sent to the Senate the nominations of William
Strong and Joseph P. Bradley as Associate J ustkes, one to fill
the vacancy by Grier's resignation and the other to increase the
number of Justices to nine. 44
The decision was popularly "regarded as an attack on sound
Republican·doctrine made by five judges with Democratic affilia.. Dissenting opinion in, Hepburn v. Griswold, supra note-1, at 633 .
.. Act. Apr. 10, 1869, c. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
" E. R Hoar and Edwin M. Stanton had been nominated previously, but
Hoar had been rejected by the Senate, and Stanton had died four days after
confirmation.
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tions while two Republican justices and one Independent had
sturdily defended the faith." 4 ;; Hence, from the coincidence of
dates, it was easy for a portion of the public to infer that as
soon as President Grant had heard of the decision he had nominated two new Republican ] ustices to reverse it. It seems that
as a matter of fact, the nominations were actually on the desk
of the Senate, which met at the same hour as the Supreme Court,
before the announcement by the Court of its decision. 46 It is
true that this does not necessarily disprove the charge, as the
President could have receh·ed information as to what the decision would be. However, even though the decision was reversed as expected, the accusation that President Grant "packed"
the Court seems unfair.
The men whom he nominated were Republicans of unquestioned standing and integrity. All the state courts that had passed
upon the question, except Kentucky, had held in favor of constitutionality, and such was the opinion of Republicans throughout the
country. It is doubtful whether· the President could have found
a Republican lawyer of standing who thought otherwise.47 It
is believed that the verdict of history is against the charge. 48
Whether the newly appointed judges should have seen fit to disregard the doctrine of stare decisis in regard to the decision just
rendered is another question.
Strong's appointment was confirmed by the Senate at once,
and he became a member of the Court March 14, 1870. Bradley's appointment was not confirmed until March 21st. ·He was
sworn in on the 23rd, and took his seat on the 24th. On the 25th
" 6 RHODES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 265.
•• Paper by Charles Bradley, a son of Justice Bradley, in BRADLEY, op.
cit. supra note 40, at 47-50.
" 1 HoAR, AuTOBIOGRAPHY oF SEn:NTY YEARS (1'903) 287; 6 RHoDES, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 270; 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 239.
'" The following support the charge: THE FEDERALIST (Ford, 1898), In_troduction, xviii; McCuLLocH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 173; ScHUCKERS,
op. cit. supra note 39, at Chap. 18, semble. The following reject the charge:
1 HoAR, op. cit. supra note 47, at 286; HART, op. cit. supra note 10, at 400;
Hoar, The Appointment of Judges Strong and Bradley (1872) 14 THE NATIOX 256; 6 RHODES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 270; 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra
note 36, at 239; DEWEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 364. The charge was made
in a Liberal Republican platform. See (1872) 14 THE NATION 234.
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the Attorney General moved to take up two cases which had
been passed over that also involved the legal tender question, and
on the following day the Court voted, five to four, to do this. 49
The majority was composed of the three justices who has dissented in Hepburn v. Griswold and the two new appointees.
With intense feeling between the Justices, 50 the question was
reconsidered, and on May 1, 1871, the decision in the so-called
Legal Tender Cases 51 was announced, by the same five-to-four
vote overruling Hepburn v. Griswold and holding the Legal
Tender Acts constitutional. The announcement of the decision
on that date was somewhat unusual, as on account of the illness
-of the Chief Justice the opinions were not made public until
January 15, 1872. The arguments pre.sented in the opinions
were substantially the same as in the earlier decision.
Was the majority justified in so quickly overruling Hepburn
v. Griswold? The country had been put upon notice so soon
after the earlier decision that the question would be reconsidered
that the reversal did not have the effect that it otherwise would
have had. In fact, even immediately after the announcement of
the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold there was no reduction in
the market premium on gold, showing that the public expected
that the legal tenders would yet be held constitutional. 52
Technically the majority in Hepbum v. Griswold consisted
-of only four Justices, in a Court legally composed of nine, the
act increasing the number of Justices having taken effect the
-first Monday of the preceding December. On the other hand, it
was due to the request of the minority for time in which to prepare dissenting opinions that the decision was not handed down
until after the date of the taking effect of Grier's resignation.
'The majority in the newly constituted Court no doubt felt somewhat justified in disregarding Grier's connection with the case
• ScHucn:as, op. cit. supra note 39, at 261-5 .
cit. snpra note 40, at 61 et seq.; HART, op. cit. s11pra n.ote
10, at 403; 6 RHODES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 268; ScHucnRs, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 265.
11
Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis), snpra note 1.
12
HART, op. cit. snpra note 10, at 403. Contra: 3 WAR~N, op. cit. sllpra
note 36, at 242.
.. BRADL~Y, (Jjl.
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because of his physical enfeeblement and the circumstances under which his adherence to the decision had been secured.
The chief objection to the reversal was the resultant loss of
public confidence in the Court, which presisted for some years. 53
However, the contemporary prediction of "The Nation" that a
reversal would set a precedent which would result in constant
tampering with the number of the Supreme Court Justices by
Congress has not been justified.:;-~.
\Vhiie the reasoning in Hepburn v. Griswold was applicable
to the entire constitutional question, only preexisting debts were
actually involved in the facts of the case. The later Court could
have preserved a technical adherence to the doctrine of stare
decisis by iimiting Hepburn v. Griswold to that situation and
holding the Acts valid as to all obligations thereafter contracted.
In view of the nature of the Court's reasoning, this would not,
however, have been a frank method of handling the situation.
It also would have meant that Hepburn v. Griswold would still
destroy the feasibility of the issuance of such legal tender in the
future.
In Juilliard v. Greemnmt, 55 the last of the legal tender cases,
decided in 1884, it was held that Congress could issue legal tender notes in times of peace as well as war, the earlier cases having passed only upon the war-time power.
Did the framers of the Constitution intend that Congress
should have the power to make other than gold and silver legal
tender in the payment of private obligations? In an endeavor
to answer this question the parties to the controversy assiduously
searched the records of the Federal Convention and other early
documents, but without conclusive results. The language of the
Constitution leaves the question open, and the debates in the
Convention do not reveal any consensus of opinion. The word
·"coin" is used, as has already been pointed out, and the Convention rejected by a vote of nine states to two a resolution which
"' 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 244.
"' Editorial, The Reopening of the Legal Tender Case (1870) 10 Tat NATION 218.
•• Legal Ten.der Case (Juilliard v. Greenman), supra note 1.
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would have added to the clause granting the power to borrow
money the words "and emit bills." 56
Those who framed the Constitution had experienced the evils
of depreciated paper money. During the Revolutionary \Var
the states had issued over $200,000,(X)() of paper notes, which
had become totally worthless before the Convention assembled. 57
The Continental Congress had issued $241,552,780 of paper
money, $119,400,000 of which had been redeemed at the rate of
forty to one, the remainder, except $6,000,000, being eventually
a total loss. 58 One of the principal causes which led to the experiment of creating a national government was the desire to
prevent such abuses. There was "a loud and general outcry
against the conduct of the people of Rhode Island, who had
kept themselves aloof £rom the national convention, for the express purpose, among others, of retaining to themselves the
power to issue such currency." 59
Nevertheless the nature of the discussion in the Convention is
such
to permit the inference that the delegates did not intend
to definitely deprive Congress of the legal capacity to issue bills,
preferring rather to trust to the strength of the new government
as a protection against abuses. The debate was upon a proposition to grant the power expressly, and its rejection is consistent
with an assumption that the delegates felt that the power otherwise existed.
Was the issuance of the legal tenders necessary for the preservation of the government during the Civil War? The answer
to this depends entirely upon the state of popular sentiment in
support of the·government at that time. This was only a matter
of personal estimate then, and Ca.nnot now be accurately judged.
While the issuance was being considered, "The London Economist" seized upon the difficulties of, the situation to deliver an

as

.. 2 Tnr; R:£coRDs oF '.I.'H£ Fsn:eRAL CoNVJ;NTION oF 1787 (Farrand, 1911)
309 et seq.; 5 DSBAn:s oN '.I.'H£ AnoPTioN oF '.I.'H£ FsnSRAL CoNSTI'.I.'UTION (Elliot, 1907) 434 et seq.; DSWSY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 67.
"' Dr;wr;y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 36; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Clifford, Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee and :Parker v. Davis), supra note
1, at 622.
.. Dr;wr;Y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 36, 39, 41, 92; BOGAR'l', op. cit. supra note
12, at 112.
.. 2 CURTIS, HrsTORY oF '.I.'H£ CoNS'.I.'ITuTroN (1858) 329.
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editorial homily to the effect that Lincoln should arrange a settlement of the war, in spite of popular clamor, pointing out that
the Xorth's money. which was the strong element on its side at
the outset, had been spent, or nearly all, and that the South was
still unsubdued.
In the same editorial the case for inflation
was well put as follows : 60
"\\re long ago nientioned, if not to prophesy, at least to conjecture, that which is now happening. We showed that the
pecuniary cost of a great military effort, such as the North
is now making-an effort which costs more than seven
times as much as the ordinary revenue in past times, could
not be rationally defrayed by taxation. The tax-gatherer
arriYes at a limit to his exactions long before such vast sums
can be realized. Credit is the natural resource of those who
have it, but Federations at a .crisis of revolutionary disunion
cannot hope to have credit abroad; and America is a poor
country,-perhaps that is an unduly offensive expressiona new country, in which profits are very high, and in which
every sixpence is profitably invested. The rate of interest
in Wall Street used always to be double the interest in Lombard street. Such a country cannot lend its Government
much, for it has no capital disengaged. The currency remains the one fund from which a Government in the crisis
of revolution, when all credit is at an end, can at once ob·
tain a large sum. * * *
"The general conclusion is the painful and lamentable one,
that if l\1r. Chase will spend the money he talks of, he must
issue paper to an extent which will frighten every one,which will depreciate ~ecurities,-which will derange transactions,-which will take from the creditor,-which will
give to the dehtor,-which will destroy what remains of
the American credit in Europe. The only alternative is the
cessation of the war."

After the successful conclusion of an enterprise it is hard to
appreciate the difficulties and dangers encountered by those engaged in it. All that can now be said in regard to this particular
situation is that those in charge of the financial destinies of the
government found the situation desperate. They knew that the
legal tender feature would r~nder assistance to the new govern.. Editorial, Tlze Suspensio1~ of Specie Pasments at New York (1862) 20
LoNDON EcoNOMIST 57.
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ment bills, and undoubtedly some help was secured from it. The
government was saved. Whether it could have been preserved
without this action can be only matter of conjecture.
If a sufficient quantity of the legal tenders had been issued, there
would have resulted an eventual collapse of the entire monetary
system, as occurred in the case of European countries during the
World War. An important element of assistance to the government in avoiding this was the work of Jay Cooke in selling bonds
directly to the .people. 61 Cooke, a Philadelphia banker, was appointed by Chase general agent of the government for that purpose in 1863, and by January 21, 1864, he had sold $5,000,000
of six per cent. bonds directly to the people at par. The people
took the bonds at par as a matter of patr:iotism, and in 1864 the
financial tide turned in favor of the government. 02
Notwithstanding the power found to exist in Congress in Juilliard v. Greenman to lssue legal tenders in time of peace as well
as war, it seems clear that conscious inflation of legal tender is
indefensible except under the most desperate conditions threatening the existence of the government. It is an ethical question
relating to war whether it can justifiably be done then. It may
be argued that it is better for the creditor to lose a portion of his
debts than to lose his country. It is interesting to note that the
Confederacy did not resort to the device. 03
The problem closed with the resumption of specie payments
January 1, 1879. Two weeks before that date the legal tenders
reached parity with gold. 64 While the government has since
been threatened with inability to continue specie payments, a;; no
other suspension has occurred. The legal tenders have never
been retired, except in part, and $346,681,080 are still outstanding.66 After the legal_tender decisions resolutions were offered
in Congress in favor of proposed constitutional amendments to
remove from Congress the power to make other than gold and
SPAULDING, op. cit. supra note 12, at 189.
See table of depreciation in D~w~Y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 293.
"'~ RHon:es, op. cit. supra note 5, at 572.
60
D~wsv, op. cit. supra note 3, at 375.
05
D~w:ev, op. cit. supra note 3, at 447-450 .
.. D:ew:ev, op. cit. supra note 3, at 341, 377; Monthly Bulletin of National
City Bank of New York, Feb., 1929, at 29.
n
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silver legal tender. 67 Such action would not be in accord with
present monetary theories:
At the present moment of peace and prosperity the possibility
that the government will again be confronted with financial difficulties such as those encountered during the Civil War seems
very remote. The country has now developed a· vastly stronger
financial structure than it had in 1862. The Federal Reserve
System was a tower of strength during the World War. 6 B A
sufficiently desperate struggle for national existence might produce a similar financial emergency.
Joseph M. Cormack.
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3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 381.
DEwEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 503.

